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fairly comparabfe to that of a machine with a hidden defect. So long
as the injured employee has not departed from his duties, it would
seem that he should be granted compensation under the acts.2'
The principal case is an illustration of the application of the sub-
jective test of knowledge in order to reach a correct result, but without
a clear analysis of the implications involved in the doctrine. Here the
employer was fairly chargeable with knowledge of the youth of the
co~mployee and perhaps also of the presence of the pistol since that
was known to a "number of employees." But there were no evidential
facts to show knowledge of the "character or habits" of the employee. 22
Hence knowledge of such facts is either imputed or unnecessary, i. e.,
it is not one of the operative facts creating the employer's duty to
pay compensation. This means, in either event, that among the
operative facts are the boy's age, disposition, etc., and the employer's
knowledge of the same is not included. This being so, the requirement
of knowledge is misleading and to give full effect in the future to the
desirable result reached in the case under discussion, it will be neces-
sary to discard entirely the pseudo-limitation attempted to be attached
to the principles involved.
FAILURE TO TRANSMIT AN OFFER AS A TORT
It has been held the offeree's silence may be the equivalent of an
affirmative act of acceptance of an offer so as to make a binding
contract." Obviously such cases will be comparatively rare since the
offeror cannot be permitted to compel the offeree to take action to
avoid being bound by a contract unless the offeree's previous actions or
the circumstances of the parties justify. But may there not be a breach
"Swiff v. Industrial Commission (I919) 287 Ill. 564, 122 N. E. 796. This
position is strengthened by the fact that the same courts do allow recovery
where the injury is the indirect result of a practical joke. "How can his rights
be affected by the fact that the man who placed the can on the die says he did
so 'just to have some fun."' Knopp v. American Car Co. (1914) 186 Ill. App. 605.
"There can be no serious contention that the injury did not arise out of his
employment. Garls was required to present the slip given him at the window
of the office of plaintiff-in-error to receive his pay. Complying with this
regulation and standing in line waiting his turn he was jostled and thrown down
and injured through no fault of his own. It does not appear that he was
engaged in any jostling or "horseplay" .or that he in any way was responsible
for the injury he sustained." Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Board (917)
277 Ill. 53, 115 N. E. 128.
'See COMMENT (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 44I, criticising Cole-McIntyre-
Norfleet Co. v. Holloway (i919, Tenn.) 214 S. W. 817. See also (1920) 33
HAv. L. R v. 595; Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting
Legal Relations (19,7) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 2oo; Ostman v. Lee (1917) 91
Conn. 731, io1 At. 23, (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 272; r Williston, Contracts
(x92o) sec. 91; r Page, Contracts (2d ed. i92o) sec. i6o.
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of duty for which the offeror may recover damages. where silence
results from the failure of the offeree's. agent to report to his principal
the offer he has solicited ?2
Now the question as to the existence of a duty to answer an offer
promptly may arise when, either the offer is made directly to the offeree
or when it is made to the offeree's agent. In the former case the
situation seems clearly one where each party knows that the offeree's
voliti6n is alone involved and hence mere delay in acting cannot be
considered a negligent breach-of duty. It may show an acceptance of
the contract,' it may be a breach of a collateral contract either to
accept or reject under certain conditions,4 or it may, where the offer
has expired by lapse of time, demonstrate that the offer was not to
be accepted." Other than this apparently it can have no operative
effect.
Where the offer is made to the offeree's agent, however, there would
seem to be occasions where the agent's negligence is a breach of duty
which renders the principal liable in damages. The essential fact in the
creation of such a duty is not mere delay in acceptance, but is the
agent's failure to present the offer to his principal for acceptance within
a time considered proper under the facts of a particular case. Thus
in a well considered insurance case, application was made for life
insurance, the agent neglected to forward the-application, and the appli-
cant died before action was taken upon the application although accord-
ing to the company's ,usual course of business action should have been
taken before the death occurred. Recovery was had against the com-
pany on the theory that the agent was negligent. 6 The question arose in
the recent case of Four States Grocer Co. v. Wickendon (1919, Tex.)
'The negative answer seems to be suggested in (920) 33 HARV. L. REV. 595,
note 6.
' See note I, supra.
'Note (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 56I, criticising Evans Piano Co..v. Tully
(1917) II6 Miss. 267, 76 So. 833. -5x 'Williston, op. cit., sec. 53.
'Duffle v. Bankers Life Ass'n (1913) i6o Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1O87, approved
in (1913) 27 HARv. L. RFEV. 92. Semalso (1913) 13 COL. L. REV. 647; (1913) 1I
MIcH. L. Rav. 6o6. In accord see Boyer v. State Farmers' Mutual Hail Ins.
Ass'n (1912) 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329, 4o L. R. A. (N. S.) 164, note: Wilken
v. Capitol Fire Ins. Co. (1916) 99 Neb. 828, 157 N. W. 1021; contra, Nat'l Fire Ins.
Co. v. School District (I916) 122 Ark. 179, 182 S. W. 547; Dorman v. Conn. Fire
Ins. Co. (1914) 41 Okla. 549, 139 Pa. 262. Compare Meyer v. Central States
Fire Ins. Co. (1919, Neb.) 173 N. W. 578; Trask v. German Ins. Co. (1893)
53 Mo. App. 625; (1894) 58 Mo. App. 431. Some cases hold that failure to
communicate rejection of an application for insurance within a reasonable time
constitutes an acceptance, but the general rule is contrary. See cases collected
(1919) 33 HARV. L. Rav. 2o6, notes 40 and 41; 4o L. R. A. (N. S.) 164; 36
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1211. The Duffle case relies partly on the contention that
insurance is a public calling. Notwithstanding the ingenious argument by Pat-
terson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy (919) 33 HARv. L. REv. 216-
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217 S. W. IIO3, where one Joplin, agent for the grocer company, took
an order from Wickendon in October, 1916, for 3 bales of duck to
be shipped August I, 1917, "order taken subject to acceptance" of the
company. Joplin did not send the order to the company which first
heard of it when Wickendon wrote on July 5, "I917, asking that ship-
ment be made during the following month. Upon the company's
refusal to ship the goods at the price stated in the order Wickendon
sued for damages and recovered a verdict and judgment. The court
now reverses this judgment and orders judgment entered for the
company.
Wickendon had brought his action in two counts, one in ordinary
form for breach of contract, while in the other he stated the facts in
detail and alleged that he believed his order had been accepted as he
had no notice to the contrary until-July, 1917, that he failed to purchase
duck as he otherwise would and hag now been forced to purchase in
the open market at a much higher price and that the defendant is now
estopped from denying the making of a contract, because of the
negligence of its salesman and the plaintiff's belief that his order had
been received. The court in its opinion seems to concede the vital
element of the plaintiff's case, as it says that "Joplin personally owed
both his employer and his customer the duty to promptly transmit
orders taken in the course of his business." It then curiously bases its
decision for the company on the ground that Joplin's breach of duty
was not that of his employer. This holding must surely be erroneous,
for Joplin was certainly acting within the scope of his authority in
transmitting orders to the company: that was very nearly the only
thing he was to do under his contract of employment. Hence if the
duty exists upon Joplin's part-and there is more question about this
than the court indicates-it must also exist upon his employer's part.
The court was doubtless misled by the fact that the plaintiff attempted
to work out a contract by estoppel instead of stating directly a cause of
action based upon the agent's negligent failure to transmit the offer.-
Should such a duty of promptly transmitting the offer be held to
28, that in view of the nafure of the business, insurance should be effective upon
presentation of a proper application without reference to acceptance, it seems
clear that the company should be privileged to reject risks without regard to
its reasons, i. e., to choose those with whom it wishes to deal. Richards, Insur-
ance (3d ed. igxo) secs. 6o, 94. Hence the criticism of the Dufle case on this
point in (1913) 27 HARv. L. Ray. 92, seems correct. If, however, the company
may be held for its agent's failure to transmit an application promptly, the
applicant is reasonably well protected against the company's delay.
'The court says: "To' hold that the appellant owed the duty of transmitting
to itself for confirmation orders taken in that manner would be absurd. The
very fact that the order must be accepted before the contract is made shows
that the appellant was in no sense a party to the transaction of taking the order.
Joplin had no authority to bind it in any manner." The cases cited'in note 6,
supra, as being contra to the Duffle case seem to question the agent's authority.
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exist?' There are these arguments to the contrary: (i) the lack of
judicial precedents may indicate that such a duty is not contemplated
or relied upon in ordinary business practice; (2) since a similar duty
seems not to exist when the offer is made directly to the offeree it may
be unreasonable for the offeror to rely on the existence of a duty in this
case; and (3) the offeror may protect himself with comparative ease
either by limiting the duration of the offer or by entering into a col-
lateral contract with the agent for an early reply, (such contract appar-
ently being within the scope of the agent's authority) or by making
prompt inquiries. Nevertheless it is submitted that such a duty should
be held to exist and that it is more in accord with business practice so
to hold. The agent's main business is to transmit the offer and surely
the offeror may expect that the agent will do what he is apparently hired
to do. It is not to be expected that the offeror will wish to limit his
offer, all the more if, as would seem from his making it, it is advan-
tageous. Nor should he be required to protect himself in a way which
would thus limit the possibility of making a contract and hence be dis-
advantageous to both parties. Then if it is his place to make inquiries,
when must he start to inquire, that is, when is he to expect that his
offer has gone astray? Is it not unfair to make him responsible for a
failure to guess correctly? Moreover it is well known that the pro-
vision requiring acceptance is only a matter of protection to the seller,
and non-acceptance will be the unusual course.9 Else why is the agent
soliciting orders? In common judgment one buys from the agent.
If the seller has made it an offer instead of a sale it but accords with
business practice to put the affirmative duties connected with acceptance
upon the seller. Therefore rather than force the buyer to make
inquiries, it is fairer to hold that the duty of transmission rests upon
the agent. It might be feasible to consider that under the circum-
stances there was an implied contract to reply promptly to the offer,
but as there seems to be a negligent breach of duty it is unnecessary
to resort to presumptions as to the intentions of the parties.'0
If such duty exists, it would seem breached whether the offer would
have been accepted or not." The acceptability of the offer-a ques-
S Since a suit for the agent's negligence will lie against either the agent or the
principal, where the agent is acting within the scope of his authority, the question
here of duty owed by the principal to the offeror is identical .with that of duty
owed by the agent to the offeror and vice versa.
'Star Clothing Mfg. Co. v. Jones (i92o, Ark.) 218 S. W. 175, a suit by an
agent to collect from his employer commissions on sales. It was held that the
employer had as to the agent a duty to accept all orders from bona fide pur-
chasers made in accordance with the provisions previously specified and could
not refuse to accept because of an advance in market price beyond that at which
the agent was authorized to sell.
"Duffle v. Bankers' Life Ass'n., supra, p. 24 of i6o Iowa.
"In Duffle v. Bankers' Life Ass'n., supra, it is expressly stated by the court
that the jury might have found that in all reasonable probability the application
would have been accepted. But note Dorman v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., supra.
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tion of fact for the jury-would affect simply the question of damages.If the offer was unacceptable, the damages would be only nominal.Here, too, an unreasonable delay upon the part of the offeror in makinginquiries may be important as showing that he could not reasonablyhave relied so long on the expected acceptance of the contract andshould have taken steps to mitigate the damages. Such questionswould then all be matters of fact for the jury's decision in determining
the amount of recovery.
Another question occurs where the offer is that of a proposed con-tract for the benefit of a third person.- To whom is then the duty herein question owed? In the insurance case 12 it was held that it was owedto the estate of the decedent and not to the proposed beneficiary. Thisseems unjust, for the substantial loss falls upon the beneficiary andnot upon the creditors or heirs of the applicant. The loss is that of anexpectancy and while the courts have beenl slow to believe that inter-ference with an expectancy is a breach of a duty, yet the trend ofdecisions seems that way.13  Where the offeror goes so far as to makean offer of a contract for the benefit of a third party, the requirement




Again the question of free speech has come before the Supreme
Court, this time in Schaefer v. United States (March I, 192o) Oct.Term, 1919, Nos. 270-274. The opinions add little to the Abrams
case. The majority (Justice McKenna) states the contention of thedefendants indicted under the Espionage Law as that "the morale ofthe armies when formed could be weakened or debased by question
'Duffle v. Bankers, Life Ass'n., supra.
"See cases collected in (Ix18) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 507. The cases of
injunctions against labor unions are perhaps the commonest. In Hall v. Hall
(r917) 91 Conn. 514, (1917) 27" YALE LAW JOURNAL, 263, such an action inconnection with an expectancy as heir was denied. But see strong dicta inLewis v. Corbin. (I907) 195 Mass. 52o. An early case is Tarleton v. McGarvley(1793) Peake, 2o5.
" (i9i8) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 507."But the rule urged in the text should nevertheless exist even in such juris-dictions in the case of life insurance policies, since the beneficiaries are gener-ally permitted to sue upon the policies. i Williston, op. cit., sec. 369.x gig) 40 Sup. Ct. 17. See, for discussion of that case and of the principlesinvolved, CommE T (r92o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 337.
